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TORT OBLIGATIONS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.t
CREATION OF LIABILITY.

"It is not questioned but that, if liable under the e foci
delicti, the defendant ought to be held liable here. The right tot
sue for the tort, the liability of the perpetrator, and the defenses
that he may plead are, with few exceptions, governed by the law
of the place." ' This statement enunciates the rule prevailing
in this country upon the subject and is sound upon principle and
authority.
The theoretical explanation of the doctrine may be stated
briefly. Suppose a hypothetical plaintiff, P, is in Massachusetts.
While there he is protected by and owes obedience to Massachusetts law. That law recognizes certain interests of P as entitled to protection, as, for instance, P's unimpaired bodily condition. If D, the defendant, injures P by committing a battery
upon him, the Massachusetts law gives P a claim for money
damages against D, a right to be made whole, so far as payment.
of monek can accomplish it, for the harm done P. Massachusetts law is the only law which can properly determine the legal
consequences of D's act for it was the only law in control where
the transaction complained of took place.'* That law must determine whether the harm done to P was to an interest entitled
to protection, whether the conduct of D was of the sort that
renders him accountable to P for its injurious consequences to
tThis article is an extract from a textbook on "The Conflict of Laws," by
Professor Goodrich, now in course of preparation, and is here published by
permission of the Vest Publishing Company.
'Ladd, I., in Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, s7 la. :S
98 X. W. 9x8, io2 N. W. 836, "It is the law of -this state, and generally, that
the law of the place where the injury was received determines whether a rig,1
of action exists." Pendar v. H. & B., etc., Co., 35 R 1. 321, 87 AtL z (9.3).
'"The theory . . . is that, although the act complained of was stibject
to no lawv having force in the forum. it gave rise to an obligation, an obgatio,
which like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.... . . But as the only'source of this obligation is the law of the pla.e of the act, it follows that that law determines not
merely the existence of tht' obligation . . . but equally determines its extent. Holmes. J.. in Slat'er v. Mex. National R. Co., x94 U. S. zO,24 Sup.
Ct. s~8; Ace.. Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 224 N. Y. 99, i2G N.
E. 198. and Hughes, I., in Spokane, etc, R. Co. v. VW1hitl-y, 237 U. S. 487,2w

Sup. Ct. 655. This theory is criticized and a different analysis made in a brl

liant paper by Professor . N
W. Cook, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YAU L JOUuL 457.
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p,2 whether the connection between D's conduct and P's injury
was-close enough to hold D responsible, and whether P's own
conduct was of such nature as to preclude him from recovery3
If P brings his action against D in New York for this Massachusetts battery he is not asking New York to give an extraterritorial effect to the Massachusetts law. He asks that Tiew
York recognize and enforce his claim against D,' acquired in
Massachusetts and givien by Massachusetts law. If Massachusetts law gave him, under the circumstances, no claim against
D, he has nothing to enforce when he sues D in New York, and
should not be allowed to recover.
A different rule prevails in England. It was held in Machado z,Fontes 4 that an action could be maintained in England
for a libel published in Brazil by- the defendant concerning the
plaintiff, even though by the law of Brazil, the act c9mplained
of was not a ground of action against the defendant in which
the plaintiff could recover damages. It was enough, the court
thought, that the defendant's acts were not "justifiable" by the
law of Brazil. The decision has been criticized by American
writers." The plaintiff, in such a case, has no claim to be enforced by action in the second state. The defendant's liability
to criminal punishment by the public authorities at the place
'here seizuie of the plaintiff's goods in Muscat by defendant was permitted by the law there in force at the time, no recovery was allowed in an
action for conversion brought in England. Carr v. Fracis Times & Co.,

[m1) A.

x(

*So where a plaintiff was precluded from recovery by the law of Maine, "
where his injury took place, because his injuries occurred while he was unlawfully traveling on Sunday, he was denied relief when he sued in New Hampshire. Beecham v. Portsmouth Bridge. 68 N. H. 382. And if a plaintiff's
claiui is barred by his contributory negligence by the lex loci delicti, he cannot recover in another state where the law may be different. L. & N. R. Co.
v. Whitlow's Admr., ig Ky. L. Rep. 1931, 43 S. V. 711, criticizing Johnson
v. C.& N. W. Ry. Co., 91-Iowa 248, 59 N. W. 66; Bridger v. Asherville & S.
1. R., 27 S. C. 456, 3 S. E. 86o; Railway'v. Lewis, 89 Ten. 235, 14 S.W. 603.
Conversely, if 'contributory negligence does -not bar the plaintiff under the
lex loci delicti, he may recover even when he sues in a state where the common' law rule on the subject prevails. Morrisette v. C. P. R. Co., -6 Vt. 267.
156 AM. oz- Accord, assumption of risl. S. C. & G. R. Co. v. Thurmaq xo6
G2 804,32 & L ft
91
71x-]2
Q.B. 23L.
Thus Minor (P.479 note) says: "The decision is in direct contradiction
of all the principles of private international law relating to torts, and if followed to its logical conclusions would oxerturn all the rules established for
the governance- of such cases.' See also 2 Wharton xo96; it HA". L
REv. 26t, and in England, icey, 3d td, s, also criticizes the logic of the
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where his act was done is a matter with which they, and not this
plaintiff, are concerned. No case in this country has been found
where recovery in tort has been allowed for what was not the

basis of an action by the lex loci delicti.8
SITUS

OF THE TORT.

Some difficulty may be encountered in determining the locus
delicti. Suppose the defendant carelessly does an act in state A
which results in harm to the plaintiff in state B. The law of B
controls. The plaintiff does not sue the defendant for the latter's negligence, but because the negligence has caused the plaintiff harm. The tort is complete only when the harm takes place,
and it is the law of the state where this happens that determines
the existence of the plaintiff's claim." A similar question arises
when an action is brought to recover damages for a death by
wrongful act. The defendant, by a negligent act done in state
A, starts a force which injures the victim in state B from which
he subsequently dies in state C. Under the statute of which
state isan action for damages for the death to be brought? The
weight of authority is that the law of B where the injury takes
place, must give the right of action if recovery is to be had,
though the death of the injured party is a condition precedent to

its accrual.8
' In some cases the phrase "actionable or punishable by the law of the
place in which it is done" appears, though no significance is attached to the
term "punishable." Le Forest v.Tolman, iiT 'Mass, iog; Carter v. Goad, so
Ark. 155, 6 S. \V. 719. Others omit that term in the requirement. The
Lamington, 87 Fed. 752; Ala., etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, xx So. 8o3,
18 L. R. A. 433. 38 Am. St. Rep. 163; McLeod v. C. & P. R. R. Co., 58 Vt
7z7, 6 AtI. 648.

-ee Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 29

Sup. Ct. 51i.A death caused by defendant's wrongful act is not "justifiable."
Yet no action may be brought to recover damages therefor unless allowed by
the law where the injury was inflicted. \ hitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N. Y.
465. See further s6 L. R. A. 194, note.

Ala., etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, supra, note 6; Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53
Ark. 381, 13 S. XV. 1o92; Conn. Valley L. Co. v. M. C. R. Co., 78 N. H. 553
103 Atl. 263. See Leonard v. Decker. 22 Fed. 741. Cf. Smith v. So. Ry. Co.,
136 Ky. 162, 123 S. W. 678. On jurisdiction for criminal punishment, see
People v. Zayas, 217 N. Y. 78, III N. E. 415. and note in aS L R. A. 59.

'Van Doren v.Pa. R. Co., 35 C. C. A. 282. o3 Fed. 26o; De Ham v. Mex.
N. Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 38!; Rudiger v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 94.
Wis. 191, 68 N. ANT.
661; Contra, Hoodmacher v. L. V. R. Co., 218 Pa. 2x, 66
AtI. 975. But compare Centofanti v. Pa. R. Co.. 4 Pa. 255, go AtL 55& See
56 L. R. A. 218, note, and 9 L R. A. (X.S.) io7&
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LIMITATIONS UPON PLINTIFF's RIGHT.
How far will the rules of the law of the place be looked to
in determining the plaintiff's recovery for an alleged tort? Matters of procedure are unquestionably governed by the lex fori.'
While the time in which an action may be brought is generally
regarded as a matter of procedure and therefore governed by
the law of the former, a limitation upon the time fdr bringing
suit, where a statute creates a right of action is frequently dedared to be a limitation upon the right itself and controlled by
the lex loci delicti.'0 Even after a right has arisen the law-making power of the state of its creation may effectually limit the
time in which an action to enforce it may be brought, and this
limitation will be effective when suit is brought in another state."
A leading English case goes further- and holds in effect that the
plaintiff's right can be taken away altogether by the law-making
power of the place of injury, and no action can afterwards be
2
maintained elsewhere to enforce the claim.'
A somewhat similar problem is involved when the lawmaking body of the state where a cause of action for a tort
arises endeavors to encourage home industry by a limitation upon
the place where suit may be brought, as by providing that the
action shall be maintained in the courts of that jurisdiction and
not elsewhere. If this can be interpreted as but a. prohibition.
against suit outside the state, it will not preclude recovery elsewhere.'" A statute of New Mexico in terms made recovery for
' This general proposition is undisputed. Solution of the difficult questdons of what are matters of substance and what are matters of procedure is
not undertaken in this discussion.
"The Harrisburg, I9

U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct.

4o.

'Davis v. Mills. io4 U. S. 45i, - Sup. Ct. 692. In this case the time
allowed in which suit could be brought was sufficient so that there was no
violation of due process of law.
Phillips v. Eyre, L R. 6 Q. B. r. X assaulted and imprisoned A in
Jamaica. At the time, the act was assumed to be wrongful by the law of
Jamaica. The Legislature there afterwards passed an act by which the assault was "made . . . lawful." Recovery in England was denied. See
Dicey, 3d ed., pp. 704 and 768. Might not such legislation in this country be
objected to as a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution? While
it has been said that 'there can be no vested right in a claim for damages for
a tort," Carson v. Gore-Meenan Co., 229 Fed. ;65, such a statement seems too
broad. See 33 HAv. L. R.v. 727.
"Tenn., etc.. Co. v. George. 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587. See a note
discussing the problem, 23 Co.. L. REv. 167.

TORT OBLIGATIO.S AND CONFLICT OF LAWS

personal injuries inflicted within the territory conditional upon the
bringing of an action in New .Mexico within one year from the
time such injuries occurred. The plaintiff, who had been injured by the defendant in New Mexico. brought suit in Texas
and recovered, without having brought suit in New Mexico. The
United States Supreme Court held that allowing recovery in
Texas did not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 14 Ill considered as the legislative policy appears, it is
difficult to see why this condition upon the right did not condition it everywhere, as was said in the .dissenting opinion. In
another case where the plaintiff was a citizen of .New Mexico,
the Te*xas court- refused' fo allow "him to recover when the injuries had been sustained in New Mexico and he had not complied with its statute 1 5
"LOCAL" AND

"TRAxsITORY"

ACTIONS.

In the early ages of common law judicial history, juries
were selected for their personal acquaintance with the parties
and knowledge of the facts of the cause. \Vith zuch a system
prevailing it was obviously impossible that redress could be given
for a foreign tort, or any other foreign cause of action. It was
strictly necessary that the neighborhood where the jury was summoned should be that where the cause of action had arisen.
This difficulty disappeared, however, when evidence could be
There
presented to the jury by the testimony of witnesses3
was another difficulty in the way in England. As Professor
Beale states it: "In its origin the jurisdiction of the king's courts
was based upon the commission of
. .
in personal actions
the breach of the king's peace; and as this was a jurisdictional
fact, the tort, includihg the breach of the peace, must be laid as
",A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers. 213 U. S. 55. 29 Sup. Ct. 397, criticized
in

22

HAPv. L. REv. 535. "'Where the statute creating the right provides an

exclusive remedy, to be enforced in a particular way, or before a special tribunal. the aggrieved party will be left to the remedy given by the statute which
created the right." Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 23 U. S. 481, 490, 32
Sup. Ct. 205.

S. P. Co. v. Dusablon, 48 Tex. Civ. App. --o3, io6 S. W. 766. See also
Coync v. S. P. Co., 155 Fed. 683.
' For discussion of this topic see elaborate note to Mostyn v. Fabrigas"
x Smith's Leading Cases, or Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, go
et seq.
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occurring at some place within the kingdom. When the new
action on the case came into existence the same form of allegation naturally continued." I- As in other instances in the development of our law the obstacle was circumvented by a fiction.
A fictitious venue was laid at some place within the kingdom,
and this fictitious allegation was not allowed to be disputed.
So it became possible in England to sue for a foreign tort.

8

The same result had been reached earlier in this country without
employing the fiction."9 It may be said generally, then, that a
personal action may be brought in any place where the requisite
service upon the defendant may be had.20 Legislatures may
and sometimes do forbid suits within the state upon certain foreign causes of action. 2 ' Such a provision does not affect general principles but only governs the courts of the particular
state.

-

One class of personal actions has been held to be local, not
transitory, so that recovery is not allowed outside the state
where the offense occurred. The chief instance is the action for
trespass to foreign realty. The numerical weight of authority
refuses to allow a recovery in such a case,22 though there is
vigorous dissent 2 3 and frequent reluctance on the part of courts
to apply the rule. The more reasonable view seems opposed to
""The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners," 26 HARv. L Rev. 29o.
"Mostyn v. Fabrigas, i Cowp. 161, 1 Smith's Leading Cas., xrth ed., 66z
"Anonymous, 2 Mass. Col Rec. 255.
"This proposition is necessarily implied in all the cases cited in this discussion where recovery was allowed for a foreign tort. See also Mitchell v.
Harmony, 13 How. (U. S.) 13s, 137; Roberts v. Dunsmuir, 75 Cal. 203, 16
Pac. 782; Simpson Fruit Co. -. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 215 IlL 596, 92 N. E.
524; Ackerson v. Erie Ry. Co., 31 N. J. L 3og; McLeod v. C. & P. Ry. Co.,
,supra, note 6. For limitations in New York, see Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns.
134; Burdick v. Freeman, z2o N. Y. 42o, z4 N. E. 949; Smith v. Crocker, 14
App. Div. 245, 43 N. Y. Supp. 427.
" Chambers v. B. & 0. R. Co., 2o7 U. S. x42, 28 Sup. Ct. 34; Wall v. C. &
0. Ry. Co., 22o Ill. 2 -, 125 N. E. 2o.
"Ellenwood Y. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 105, 15 Sup. Ct. 771; Kroll
v. Ry. Co., 9)S Neb. 322, 152 N. W. 548; Montesano Co. v. Portland Iron
Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 Pac. 244; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Mocambique, [1893] A. C. 6D2.
' Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. z; Little v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 65 Minn. 48,
67 N. W. 846. The New York statutes now permit the action though the
statute has been held not to be retroactive in its application. Jacobus v. Colgate, 21, -N. Y. 235, Ill N. E. 837, commnented upon in 29 H,,v. L. REv. 875.
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the self-imposed limitation of jurisdiction upheld by the majority,
which seems an archaic survival of outworn rules of venue. The
action is one for damages; the determination of the foreign title
for the purposes of this suit is "merely the incidental determination of a fact such as the co.urts are every day compelled to
make." *4 - The majority- rule permits a defendant to escape all
liability for the harm he does if he prevents suit in the state
where the land lies by keeping beyond service of process in that
jurisdiction.
Such an arbitrary doctrine should not be extended and cases
seem properly decided which allow the plaintiff to recover for
conversion of crops, lumber, or minerals severed from the land
in another jurisdiction, even though an entry on the land was
M2
involved in the commission of the alleged offense.
CONDITIONS UPON ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN LIABILITY.
Assuming the plaintiff has acquired tinder the law of a foreign state, a claim in tort against the defendant, and that the
claim is "transitory" and not "local," are there further obstacles
to its enforcement in any common law forumn he may choose ? 28
There are still three possible difficulties. 2 1" The claim against
the alleged wrong-doer may be regarded as penal in its nature,
and so not enforcible outside the state where it arose, for it is
well settled that one state will not enforce penalties imposed by
another. The question of what constitutes a penal law need not
be re-examined here; it is not improbable that this restriction
will have less significance after the United States Supreme
See Beale. 26 HARv. L. Rev. 2'9!, 292; Judicial comments and a collection
of authorities may be found in 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928. Well-written criticism
may be found in Kuhn, "Local and Transitory Actions in Private International
Law," 66 U. OF PA. L REv. 3o.
'*Hodges v. Hunter Co., 6x Fla. 28o, _4 So. 8n; Arizona Mining Co. v.
Iron Cap Copper Co., ixg Me. 2,3, nio At. 429; Jacobus v. Colgate, supra,
note 23. But see Arizona Min. Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co.. 236 Mass. x8s,
128 N. E. 4. For further cases, see notes, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940, 34 idem.
994- 9 Rules
of civil law countries on this subject differ widely
from ours and
are not intended to be included in statements made herein. See "The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners," by J. H. Beale, 26 HxAv. L. REv. 193.
I Acc, Lauria v. duPont de Nemours Co., 241 Fed. 687, 69o.
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Court's elaboration of what constitutes a penal law.2 T A second
difficulty is that the legal machinery of the forum may be unsuited to the enforcement of a right of the kind given by the
lex loci delicti. This is not'a common but is an entirely possible
situation.- Slater v. Me.r. Nat. R. Co. 2 6 is an instance. The plaintiffs sought to recover in Texas compensation for injuries sustained in Mekico which had resulted in the death of Slater. By
the Mexican law the danages recoverable were to be paid in
periodical payments, the amounts of which were subject to modification by the court from time to time, in case of change of
circumstances of the beneficiaries. The common law court had
no machinery for giving an award of this sort, and it was
thought that justice would not be done in giving the kind of relief which could be offered as a substitute. Mr. Justice Holmes
said: "But to reduce a liability conditioned as this was to a
lump sum would be to leave the whole matter to a mere guess."
The third possible obstacle to the plaintiff's suit is that the,
enforcement of the foreign cause of action may be contrary to
that vague thing called "the public policy of the forum." This
difficulty is not peculiar to the enforcement of claims for foreign
torts, but appears in settling questions of recognition of nearly
all foreign acquired rights. By the very nature of the question
involved, it is impossible to state definitely in advance what tort
claims acquired under foreign law are to be refused enforcement because of conflict with the public policy of the forum.
But one or two points concerning the problem may be made.
Does policy denaiid that the forun refuse to enforce any
claim for redress for a foreign tort if te facts on which the
claim is based would not have created a similar claim in the
jurisdiction where recovery is now sought? The affirmative is
the rule in England. In the leading case of The HlallCy 29 an ac"For

a strong decision showing the present tendency. see Loucks v.

Standard Oil Co., supra. note ia. and Sullivan v. Hustis.

237

Mass. 441, 446-

The latest Supreme Court case is Atchison, etc., Ry. Co.
v. Nichols, 2-64 U. S. 34S, 44 Sup. Ct. 353 (924), in which Huntiington v. Atrill
is cited and followed.
4 4 8,

130 N. E. z47.

x94 U. S. i--o. 24 Sup. Ct. 58i; Acc., Mexican Nat. Ry. Co. v. Jackson,
89 Tex. 107, 33 S. XW.857. Suppose a suit in equity had been brought, alleging an inadequacy of the remedy at law?
. [L. R 2 P. C. i93.
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tion was brought in England for damages sustained in a collision
between the vessel of the plaintiffs and that of the defendants.
The accident took place in the river Scheldt, and was due to the
negligence of the pilot whom the owner of the vessel was compelled to employ. By the Belgian or Dutch law the owner was
liable for results of the negligence of the pilot under such cirScurmstances; by the law of England he was not. It was held
that no action could be maintained in England. 0
The theoretical explanation for such a rule is the objection
to giving damages or in effect punishing something which English law does not condemn .31 But imposition of tort liability does
not necessarily involve punishment for immoral conduct. This
is well shown, even in English law, in the responsibility of the
owner for harm done by escaping water or animals, regardless
of the care he has taken to prevent it. Civil responsibility for
harm done and punishment for conduct regarded as criminal
are separate matters today even though in early law no distinct
line was drawn between the two. lay not the real source of
the difficulty be the notion that in giving redress for the foreign
wrong the forum is allowing the foreign law an extra-territorial
operation? If such were the case, it is not surprising that a
court should be reluctant to set aside its own rules and allow
the foreign law to operate when its own law expressed a different
policy. The correct position is that the foreign law has no extraterritorial effect; but that when the alleged tort occurred an
obligation was imposed upon the defendant, and this obligation
follows the person.3 2 -The law of the forum is asked to enforce
the obligation created by the foreign law.
Statements may be found by American authority to the effect that to sue for a foreign tort (.and foreign includes another
The English rule then is that an act done in a foreign country can be
sued for as a tort in England if it is wrongful, "unjiit ifiable." when done,
and if it would have been a wrong if done in England. See Dicey. 3d ed.. p.
38. and p. 694 et seq.; Baty. Polarized Law 5o, si. As already explained the
rule seems indefensibly loose on the first part of the test. It seems unduly
strict upon the second.
Dicey, 3d ed., p. 697.
See the language of Mr. Justice Holmes, note ia, supra. Reference
should also be made to the discussion by Mfr. Justice Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 Y.L L Joint. 656.
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state of the United States) the defendant's conduct must be
actionable both by the lk.r loci delicti and lez fori.33 Some of
the cases refusing to enforce rights acquired under death-bywrongful-act statutes in other states lend some support to the
view.3 4 It must be remembered, however, that the earlier statutes on this subject were not infrequently penal in character,
and this fact accotints for the result. The better view is that
recovery for a foreign tort will not be refused even though the
le.r fori would not have imposed liability had the operative facts
occurred there.3 5 Whether the foreign, claim arose under the
common law or was given by statute should make no difference.3 6 Judge Mitchell's statement of the point 37 is worth re'Wharton, Conflict of Laws, sec. 478; see, however, sec. 478a, 3d ed.,
and sec. 4a of the same. The American cases cited in sec. 478, do not support the author's text. See, however, The Lamington, 87 Fed. 752.
"Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627.
" Walsh v. N. Y. & N. F_ R. Co., i6o Mass. 571, 36 N. E. 584; Eingartner
v. Ill. Steel Co., 94 Wis. 7o, 68 N. W. 664..
' Dennick v. Cent. R. Co., io3 U. S. ii; S. C. & G. R. Co. v. Thurman,
supra, note 3; C. & E. I. R. Co. v. Rouse, 178 Ill. 132, 52 N. . 951; Nelson v. C.
& O. R. Co., 88 Va. 971, 14 S. E. 838. See N. P. R. Co. v. Babcock, 54 U. S.
190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978, ard cases in note 37, infra. So where actions are brought
in one state to recover for injuries to a miner sustained in miping operations
in another, statutory rules of the place of injury governing rights and duties
have been applied without hesitation. Vagaski v. Con. Coal Co., 2a5 Fed.
913; Majestic Collieries Co. v. Bradley, 132 Ky. 533, x16 S. W. 738; Firment
v. R. & P. Co., 17o App. Div. 3o7, r55 N. Y. Supp. 879. It would be misleading to create the impression that this position is supported by all the authorities, especially in a cause of action arising under the statute of another state.
Courts frequently say, even when allowing a recovery, that the enforcement
of the plaintiff's claim is only allowed when there is a statute in force at the
forum, substantially similar to that of the er loci dclicti. This is especially
marked in the cases where recovery is sought for damages for death by
wrongful act. A collection of authorities may be found in 56 L R. A. I95 et
scq., and see further discussion in this paper.
"Herrick v. M. & St. L Ry. Co.. 31 MIinn. I. See also Powell v. G. N.
R. Co., 1o2 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017, and Dennick v. Cent. R. Co., supra,
note 36. Cf. Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 68t. Here the forum
had substituted statutory industrial insurance for the common law rules of
employer's liability, but an action for an alleged tort occurring in Idaho was
allowed to be prosecuted. In a much more recent case than the Herrick decision, Judge Cardozo says (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, note ia):
"'Right of action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere
fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the
-plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say that
-every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
h.ome. Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its presence shows
beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend local policy. But its
absence does not prove the contrary. It is not exalted into an indispeinsable
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peating: "But it by no means follows that because the statute
of one state differs from the law of another state, therefore it
would be held contrary to the policy of the laws of the latter
state. . . . To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right
of action which accrued under the law of another state, because
against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against
good morals or natural justice, or that for some other such reason, the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens."
Further, it is difficult to imagine a case where enforcing a
claim for money damages in one state where the claim arose in
another could seriously violate notions of morality in the first.
This is especially true as between states of the United States.
Says -Mr. Justice Beach: 38 "We must admit that extreme cases
might be imagined in which the mere enforcement of a foreign
right would be an offense against good morals. But such cases
cannot arise among the several states of the United States.
Their differences relate to the minor morals of expediency, and
to debatable questions of internal policy. It would be an iutolerable affectation of superior virtue for the courts of one state
to pretend that the mere entorcement of a right validly created
by the law of a sister state would be repugnant to good morals,
would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law or would be of such evil example as to corrupt the
jury or the public."
Other important questions, like that of the burden of proof,.
questions of evidence, whose law governs the measure of damages, 39 arise, but are more appropriately considered in discussing
differences between questions of substance and procedure. It
remains to elaborate somewhat more in detail the application oi
principles already stated to a few particular situations.
condition. The misleading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of
the trouble. It has been fertile in suggesting a discretion unregulated by
general principles."
' In the article cited; note 32. above. As Judge Cardozo says (Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., supra. note ia): "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained. At
least, that is so among the states of the Union."
" See "Damages for a Foreign Wrong," 3 IowA LAW BULLETIN 1.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEX'S COMPENSATION ACTS.

Prior to the passage of Workmen's Compensation Acts,
which have now been adopted in most of our states, the rule established by the authorities was that the quegtion whether an
employee could sue his employer in tort depended upon the law
of the place where the injury occurred, not where the contract of
employment was made 3g' or where suit was brought. Jf the
law of the place of injury gave an action it could be maintained
in a state where upon the same facts none would have been created,40 and if the lex loci gave the plaintiff no claim, he could
not recover in another state. 4 1 This is a sound application to the
particular situation of the general rules determining tort liability,
and is the common law rule in the absence of statutory change.
One statutory change is the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, which governs liability for injuriessustained while the employee is engaged in interstate commerce. What constitutes employment in interstate commerce so as to bring the employee
within the act is a difficult question which need not be discussed
here.
The Conflict of Laws questions regarding Workmen's Compensation Acts have called forth many recent decisions from the
courts. The chief problem may be put thus hypothetically: W,
a workman engaged in the building trades enters the service of
the MI Company, building contractors, in Michigan.
In the
,Iourse of his employment, he is sent to work upon a job for his
employer in Ohio, and while so engaged meets with an accident.
Under what law should W seek compensation for his injuries?
.MK. C., etc., R. Co. v. Becker, 67 Ark. T. 53 S.IV. 406; Ala., etc., Co. v.
Carroll, supra, note 6. An instance of statutory modification of this rule is
found in Ruck v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 153 Wis. 158, i4o N. NV. 1o74.
' C. & E. I R. Co. v: Rouse. supra, note 36; Walsh v. N. Y. & N. .. R.
Co.; jiupra, note 3,; Njus v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 47 .Minn. 92, 49 N. W.
527; Fogarty v. St. L T. Co.. m8o Mo. 490, 79 S. W. 664. Refusing recovery,
Anderson v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 37 Wis. 321.
UAla.. etc., Co. v. Carroll, supra, note 6; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones,
x58 Ind. 87. 62 N. E. 994; Turner v. St. Clair Tunnel Co.. iii Mich. 578, 70
N. NN. 146; Alexander v. Pa. Co.. 48 Ohio St. 6123. 3o N. F. 69. So, too, if
the claim has been released by acceptance of benefits under a contract, providing that such benefits operated to release claims against defendant. Cannaday v. AtL., ,ic., R. Co., 143 N. C. 439, 55 S. E. 836.
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Mtay lie, for instance, claim compensation under the Michigan
statute? Could he also claim damages at common law in Ohio,
assuming common law rules still prevailed there?
If the compensation acts were but a statutory substitute for
the common law rules of liability, or these rules plus their statutory modifications, the rule would be clear: W's claim must
be governed by the law of the place where his injury occurred.
In the case supposed, W's claim would be settled by the Ohio
law without reference to the Michigan statute. There is some
authority for this position.4 2
But the view taken by
most courts is that there can be recovery under the act in
force in the state where the workman entered the employer's
service, even though the injury takes place elsewhere. 4 3 It is
misleading to state this result by saying that the compensation
statute of the first state has an extra-terriorial operation.4 The
Michigan statute cannot, in the case supposed, extend into Ohio
and displace the Ohio law. A more plausible explanation is that
the cbntract of employment, as made in a state where the compensation statute is in force, impliedly stipulates, inter alia, that
in case of accident the employer shall pay and the employee
shall accept compensation as provided in the statute, and that
this shall be in lieu of any other claim.4 5 Such an argument has
added force when both parties make payment into a fund from
which payments are made to injured workmen. 4 6 This contract
.'Union Bridge, etc.. Co. v.Ind. Comm.. 287 II. 396. 122 N. E. 6og; In
re Gould, 2153o2Mass. 480,
N. E. 693; Tomalin v. Pearson [igog] 2 K.
B. 61.
"Kennerson .v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atd. 372; Ind.
Comm. v. Aetna L. Ins. Co.. 64 Colo. 480, 174 Pac. 589; Crane v. Leonard, 214
Mich. 218, 183 X. W. 204; Rounsaville v. Cent. R. Co., 87 N. J.L 371, 94 At!.
392; Gooding v. Ott, 77 \V. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862; and see citations in following notes, especially note 52.
" "It is obvious that the . . . act ex propria zvqore can have no extra
territorial effect." Anderson v.Miller, etc.. Co., i69 Wis. xo6. 115, 170 N. W.
275. "When it is said that a statute, such as the Workmen's Compensation
Act, has an extra-territorial effect, it cannot mean that the law does, or attempts to. create rights abroad ....
." Lennon, J.,in Quong Ham Wah Co.
v. Ind. Ace. Comm., i84 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021.
' Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., supra, note 43; Pierce v. Bekins,
etc., Co., 185 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W. I91; Crane v. Leonard, supra, note 43;
State ex rel. Chambers v. Dist. Ct., 139 Minn. 2o5, 166 N. W. 185; Grinnell v.
Wilkinson. 39 R. 1. 447, 98 AtI. 1o3.
" Gooding v. Ott, supra, note 43.
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theory has difficulties of its own to meet. If the act is compulsory, not open to rejection by the parties, an essential element
of contract, mutual assent, is entirely lacking.4 7 Yet the statute in force at the place of employment has been held to cover
injuries sustained elsewhere even in such a case.4 8 If the obligation to pay compensation is contractual its terms will necessarily be governed by requirements in force at the time when the
employment began, and the law could not be amended as against
existing contracts in a way which would impair the contract
within the meaning of the term as used in the Constitution. 9
The claim for compensation has been held not to be contractual
within the statute of limitations.5 0 Once under the act, it is
the law and not the contract which governs; the parties
may not modify terms.5 1 So *it may be said that the
obligation to pay compensation is neither a substitute for older
tort liability nor does it involve contract but is a statutory regulation of the relation of employer and employee based upon the
theory that the industry should bear the burden of accidents incident to its operation, and that the fulfillment of this policy requires that the statute should control whether the injury occurs
within or without the state where the contract of employment
was made. The decided weight of American authority allows
recovery of compensation under the statute in force at the
place of employment though the injury occurs elsewhere. The
theory most frequently advanced is that there is a contract to
this effect. 52 A compulsory statute has been declared inapplicable, however, even though the contract of employment was made
*'See discussion, 2r Mficn L. REv. 449.
o Post v. Burger, 216"N. Y. 544. ixn N. E. 351.

In a later New .York case

the contract explanation is recognized as not well founded. Matter of Smith
v. Heine, etc.. Co.. 2-4 N. Y. 9. z19 N. E. 878. The Wisconsin court has held

the Wisconsin statute applicable to an accident without the state, though rejecting the contract explanation. Anderson v. Miller, etc., Co., supra, note 44.
See Anderson v. Miller, etc.. Co., supra, note 44'0 Davidson v. Payne, 281 Fed. 544, noted in 21
ifcH.
L Rm. 449.
'Anderson v. Miller, etc., Co., supra, note 44.

u See in addition to cases already cited. notes in 3 A. L R. 1351, i8 A. L.
R. -g9: also. Angell. "Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad." 3 HARV. L REv. 61g; and notes in 9 CArat. L. Ray. 234, and
37 HARV.L. Rv.375-
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within the state, if the services to be performed were wholly
outside the state.53
Could a workman cntitled to compensation under the Michigan statute, as in the case supposed above, institute proceedings to collect it in some other state? If the claim is considered an ordinary transitory cause of action, such enforcement
should follow as of, course. But the majority of compensation
acts provide special machinery for handling cases arising under
them; hearings before a designated commission, review and
control by an industrial board, and so on. If the .right to
compensation is limited to cases where the claimant makes use
of the designated procedure to secure it, there is no claim to be
enforced in another state unless the designated procedure has
been followed. Recovery for claims arising under the New Jer-"
sey act has been-refused in New York for this reason.5 4 On the
other hand, it has been judicially suggested that matters of
venue and compensation may well be distinguished and recovery
under a foreign act be permitted.5 5 If they can be separated
in a particular case ther.e seems no reason why recovery under
a foreign act might not be allowed.- 6
We may put further questions concefning the rights of this
workman, employed in Michigan by the Michigan company, who
is injured in the course of his employment while working for
the employer in Ohio. Could he claim compensation under
the Ohio statute? It has been held that where the act in force
at the state of employment is not applicable, recovery may be
" Matter of Smith v. Heine, etc.. Co.. supra. note 49: Gardner v. Horseheads Constr. Co., xTr App. Div. 66, 156 N. Y. Supp. &N: Perlis v. Lederer,
i,8< App. Div. 42_, 178 N. Y. Supp. 449. In Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co.,
i5o Minn. i, x83 N. W. 977, the Minnesota act was held applicable to injuries
sustained by a salesman whose territory "was for the most part in North
Dakota," the place of injury. The business of the employer was said to be
"localized" in Minnesota. The New York result finds support in Altman v.
N. D., etc., Bureau. xg5 N. AV. 287 (N. D. i93) ; coistra, under an optional
statute, Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., 218 Mich. 331, i88 N. W. 411.
"Lehmann v. Ramo Films, 92 Misc. 418, IS5 N. Y. Supp. 1032; Verdicchio v. McNab & H. Co., 178 App. Div. 48, 164 N. Y. Supp. 290.
"Douthwright v. Champlin, 9i Conn. 524, ioo Atl. 97.
The question was left open in Anderson v. Miller, etc., Co., supra,
note 44.
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had under the act in force at the place of injury." Regarding
the statute as a substitute for older tort liability, the result is
clearly sound. So, too, if it is regarded as regulation of the
incidents of the relation of employer and employee. Attempted
explanations on the contract theory seem somewhat artificial.
Other cases have applied the compensation law of the place of
injury", even where there was a contract stipulating that some
other rule should govern.5
Conclusions upon the matter, at
the present stage of development, must be very tentative. Application of the legal rules in force at the place of injury seems
the more natural rule to apply. But to carry out the purpose of
the statutes, the employee may well claim compensation under
the law of the place where he was hired, and where the emplyer's business is carried on, even though he was injured while
temporarily engaged in that business outside the state. Presumably he could not claim compensation twice.6 0

Nor can tlie

employee as against the employtr, secure a double recovery in
compensation under a statute and a judgment for damages in
tort. So where he was entitled to compensation under the act
at the place of hiring no action based upon alleged negligence
"Douthwright v. Champlin. supra. note 55. noted in 27 YALE L. JOIIL
113 (here the workinan's contract of employment was made in Massachusetts, and that court had declared the statute not applicable to injuries otftside the state): Banks v. lowlett Co., 92 Conn. 30-3. 102 Atl. 822- Smith
v. Heine. etc., Co., ii9 Ie. 5;2, 112 Atd. 516 (hiring in New York, but em-

ployment exclusively outside the state and New York statute not applicable).
See also Johnson v. Nelson. 128 Minn. 158. i5o N. W. 6-o; Bozo v. Central
C. & C. Co., 54 Utah 2_89. i8o Pac. 432.
"Amer. Rad. Co. v. Rogge. 86 N. J. L. 436. 9-2 Atl. 85, affd. 87 N. J. L.
314, 93 Atl. io083. There was no compensation law in New York at the time
of hiring, but in a case following this decision. West J. T. Co. v. Phil., etc.,
R. Co., 88 N. J. L. o2. 95 AtI. 753. where the hiring was in Pennsylvania, it
does not appear whether there was a compensation act in that state or not.
See also Royal Indem. Co. v. Platt. etc., Co.. 91 Misc. 631, 163 N. Y. Supp.
io7.

In Hopkins v.

fatchless, etc., Co., 99 Conn. 457, 121 Atl. 828, the court

said the local act did not cover an injury which took place in the state, where
the contract of hiring was in New Jersey, though no services were to be
performed in that state.
"Carl Hazenbeck. etc., Co. v. Randall, 75 nd. App. 417. 126 N. E. 5oi.
"In Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Co., i8o App. Div. 59. 16; N. Y. Sup. 274.
th New York employee. injured in New Jersey, had claimed compensation
under the New Jersey statute and afterwards claimed under the New York
law. He was allowed to do so. the insurance carrier being credited with the
amount paid under the New Jersey award.
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can be maintained at the place of injury. 6 1 A fortiori, if the
place of hiring and injury are the same, and the compensation
62
act applies, no tort action is maintainable elsewhere
DEATH BY WRONGFUL AcT.

At common law no action for damages could be maintained
against a defendant for causing the death of a human being.
This rule applied not only to a claim for injuries to the victim
asserted by his personal representative, but precluded also any
action on the part of those dependent upon the deceased who suffered pecuniary loss by reason of his death. Though no satisfactory reason for the rule was ever offered it was firmly established by authority. To relieve its harshness there was passed
in England, in 1846, a statute known as Lord Campbell's Act,
"for compensating the families of persons killed in accidents."
New York enacted legislation for the same purpose in 1847 and
such statutes have now been everywhere adopted though they
differ greatly in form and detail. From these differences Conflict of Laws questions develop.6
Barnhart v. Am: Concrete Steel Co., 227 X. Y. " 3. 125 N. 1. 675,
Schweitzer v. H amhurg Amer. Line. 78 Misc. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944' Albanese v. Stewart, 78 Misc. 5F1, 138 N. Y. Supp. 942; WasilewsWd v.
Warner Co., 87 Misc. i56. T4() N. Y. Supl'. 1035; Bozo v. Central C. & C. Co.,
svpra. note 57. See also Johnson v. Nelson. 128 "Minn. z58. i5o N. W. 620.
If the injury has been caused by actionable conduct by a third party, most
statutes provide that the employer or insurance company, upon payment of
compensation,, is subrogated to the workmen's claim against the tort feasor.
If not. settlement with such tort feasor does not preclude a claim for compensation. Newark Pay. Co. v. Klotz, 85 N. J. L. 432, 91 Att. 91; nor does
the receipt of compenzation preclude a recovery against the wrongdoer. Biddinger v. Steininger-Taylor Co., 25 Oh. Dec. 6o3. In Rorvik v. N. P. Lbr.
Co.. r9 Ore. z8, x9o Pac. 33!. m5 Pac. 163. suit was allowed in Oregon
atrainst the alleged tort feasor though the claimant had been awarded compensation in California. The statute in the latter state provided for subrogation to the amount of compensation Paid. But the award of compensation had
not been paid: further, the plaintiff's claim in Oregon was for a greater
amount than the compensation award, so the plaintiff was at least part owner
cf the claim and so entitled to sue. For discussion of the subrogation point,
see 2! MicH. L. REv. 489.
"Authorities upon the common law rule and references to the various
statutes may be found in the opening chapters of Tiffany's "Death by Wrongful
Act." A note in 64 U. OF P... L. REv. 6--6 presents the interesting question of
whether recovery by the injured man in his lifetime precludes an action by
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No action may be brought in one state for injuries resulting in death which were inflicted in another state unless an
action is given by the laws of the state where the injury occurred. 4 It is not enough that there is such a statute at the
forum, allowing recovery for death by wrongful act.0 5 If the
effect of the common law rule expressed in the maxim actio
personalis moritur cure pcrsona was only to precludb recovery
for an admitted tort because of the lack of a person to enforce
the claim, 66 a statute of the forum allowing suit in such case
by the personal representative of the deceased would supply the
defect, and the action could be allowed. But the prevailing
view is that the death statutes create a new right, 67 and this
right must be given by the lex loci delicti.
PLACE OF BRINGING ACTION.

Since, as has already been said, a claim for personal tort
is transitory in its nature, it would naturally follow that the
action for death for wrongful act could be brought wherever
the defendant could be found. This has not become the accepted
doctrine with regard to such statutes without Overcoming some
difficulties. There are earlier cases which deny the possibility
of recovery under a foreign death-by-wrongful-act statute.6 s
relatives after his death. The lex domncilii of the tort feasor, and not the
Irx loci delicti, has been held to govern the question whether an action will
survive against his estate. Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271.
" L. & N. R. Co. v. Williams, 113 Ala. 4oZ. 2t So. )38; Davis v. N. Y.
& N. E. R. Co.. 143 Mass. 301. 9 N. E. 815; Whitford v. Panama R. Co.,
23 N. Y. 465; Usher v. W. J. R. Co., 1.-6 Pa. 2o6, i7 Atl. 597. A host of
authorities to this effect may be found in z6 L R. A. 194 note. It is the
law of the place of injury, not where death occurs, which governs. See
supra, note 8.
" Davis v. N. Y. & X. E. R. Co., supra, note 64.
"As intimated in Stewart v. B. & 0. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 448, i8 Sup.
Ct. 1o5. It has been held that the right to revive an action for personal injuries. commenced before the death of the person injured, is to be determined
l,y the law of the place where the action is pending and not by the law of the
state where the cause of action arose. Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburg, elc., Ry.
Co.. 122 Ky. 3o4. 9! S. W. 742, s L. R. A. (N. S.) 756 and note.
"Ash v. B. & 0. R. Co.. 72 .Md. 144, i9 Atl. 643; Ohnesorge v. Chic. C.
Ry. Co., 259 I1. 424. 102 N. E. 819; Centof anti v. Pa. R. R., supra, note &
' Richardson v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 98 Mass. 85; Texas & P. R. Co. v.
Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627.
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There are many statements to be found which condition the recovery upon the presence of a similar statute in the forum."
With the general adoption of such legislation the question becomes whether the domestic statute is so unlike the one under
which recovery is claimed that the plaintiff shall be denied recovery. ° But under recent decisions this point becomes unimportant. Remarks by Judge Cardozo in an important New
York case are apposite in this connection.'He says: "For many
years the courts have been feeling their way in the enforcement
of these statutes. A civil remedy for another's death was sonicthing strange and new, and it did not find at once the fitting
niche, the proper category, in the legal scheme. We need not
must
.
be surprised, therefore, if some of the things said
nothis
there
that
is
be rejected today. But the truth, of course,
ing sui generis about these death statutes in their relation to the
general body of international law. We must apply the same
rules that are applicable ,to other torts; and the tendency of
those rules today is toward a larger comity, if we must cling
to the traditional term." The modern and the now prevailing
view, is to allow the action to be maintained although the injury from which death resulted was inflicted in another jurisdiction.72
WHO BRINGS THE ACTION.
The claim foi damages for death by wrongful act is, as
has been said, created by the lex loci delicti. The common form
of statute, following the English precedent in Lord Campbell's
Act, allows an action to be prosecuted by the decedent's adminA collection of these may be found in 56 L. R. A. 2o, 2o3, note.
".;6 L. R. A. 2n4, 2o5.
"Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.. supra, note ia, in which the earlier decisions
are reviewed and explained and the modem doctrine announced. See also
Lauria v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., supra, note 26a.
"2Dennick v. Cent. R. Co., supra, note 36; Lauria v. duPont de Nemours
Co., supra, note 26a; Weissengoff v. Davis, 26o Fed. 16; Rochester v. Welli
etc., Express Co., 87 Kan. 164. 123 Pac. 729; Higgins v. Central. ek., R. Co.,
x55 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. 534; Hanlon v. Frederick Leyland & Co., M Mass.
438, 1ii N. E. 9o7; Powell v. G. N. R. Co., supra, note 37; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, note xa; Whitlow v. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co., 114 Tenn. 344,

84 S. W. 618.
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istrator for the benefit of designated surviving relatives. Suppose the decedent is killed in Michigan and suit is brought
against the defendant, who negligently caused the death, in
Ohio. Is the Michigan or the Ohio administrator the proper
plaintiff? It is a well settled general rule that an administrator
appointed in one state has no standing in his representative capacity in the courts of another.7 3 But the death statute, while
it names the administrator as the party in whose name the action
is to be brought, generally provides that heemoney recovered
does not go into the general estate of the d etfeut
is a special fund for the named beneficiaries. The administrator from
the place of injury, where he sues elsewhere, does not appear on
behalf of the estate of the deceasd, but as a trustee of those
who are to get the money recovered. 74 There is ample authority
which allows the foreign administrator appointed in the state
where the deceased was injured thus to sue in a state where he
has not qualified, and upon the theory mentioned.7 5 Letters of
administration may be granted in the state where the cause of
action arose even though the deceased left no other property
" Johnson v. Powers, x39 U. S. 156, xi Sup. Ct. 525.
' If recovery is sought under a statute of the lex loci dclicti which pro-

vides for survival of actions for injuries despite the resulting death therefrom,
so that the administrator sues as personal representative of the deceased, the
damages becoming part of the estate, it seems that such a suit is one brought
by the administrator in his representative capacity and could only be maintained by o:.e who had qualified as administrator at the forum, as was done
in Higgins v. Central, etc., R, Co., supra, note 72. In Brown v. C. & N. W.
Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 347, 152 N. W. 72, an Iowa representative was allowed
to recover in finnesota, the accident having taken place in Iowa: The Iowa
statute is in terms a survival act but provides that certain persons shall receive
the amount recovered and has been treated in many ways like the ordinary
death by wrongful act statute. See 2 IowA L BVuiain 196. See also Hoes
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 73 App. Div. 363, 77 N. Y. Supp. 117; Sanbo v.
U. P. Coal Co., 13o Fed. 52.
"Knight v. Moline, -ctc., Ry. Co., x6o Iowa i6o, 14o N. NV. 839; Brown
v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 347, 152. N. W. 729; Voris v. C. M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., 172 Ao. App. 125, 157 S. W. 835; Boulden v. Pa. R. Co., 2o

Pa.

264, &4 Atl. 9o6; Connor v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co, 28 R_ I. 56o, 68 Adt.
481, 18 L R. A (N. S.) x252 and note. Contra, S. IV. R. Co. v. Paulk, 24
Ga. 356. In re Lowham, 3o Utah 436. 85 Pac. 445, the administrator had
qualified at the forum.
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If the statute vests the action in the widow or other

designated relative, such person may sue in another state."
Suppose the statute provides that the action is to be brought
by the "personal representative." Does that limit the power to
bring the action to an administrator or executor appointed in
the state where the cause of action arose?

It does not settle

this question to say that the proper party plaintiff in an action

under the foreign statute is .the person thereby authorized to
sue.18 What must be determined is, who is the person so authorized? If the statute under which the suit is brought vests
the action in beneficiaries in their own right (as widow or par-

ents), such named beneficiary, and only that person, may maintain the action in another state; even though by the law of the
forum such an action is given to the personal representative of
the decedent.-' But where the statute of the place of injury provides for "suit by the "personal representative" a more liberal
rule has been observed. A personal representative appointed in
the state in which the deceased had his domicile has been al-

lowed to sue in the jurisdiction where he was appointed,80 though,
I'r re 2Mayo, 6o S. C. 4o, 38 S. E. 634; Sharp v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry.
Co., 133 Tenn. 1, 179 S. NV. 375; Jordan v. C. & N. V. R. Co., 125 Wis. 581,
io4 N. W. 8o3, i L R. A. (N. S.) 885 and note collecting authorities. See
also Cooker v. Gulf; etc., R. Co.. 41 Tex. Civ. App. 596, 93 S. W. 2oi. This
rule arises from necessity iather than logic. If the claim is not part of the
estate of the decedent, how can an administrator of the decedent be appointed
if there is no estate to administer? But if the deceased left no belongings,
should that fact defeat the enforcement of the claim for his death because
there is no place where an administrator can be appointed? Such a rule
would preclude the bringing of the action in cases where the beneficiaries
most need it.
"Strait v. Yazoo & M. R. Co., 2o9 Fed. 157; Wooden v. Western, etc.,
R. Co., 126 N. Y. io, 26 N. E. io5o. See also note 79.
"As is said in Tiffany on Death by Wrongful Act, See. -or. Fuller discussion may be found, however, in Sec. 11o.
" Teti v. Consolidated Coal Co., 217 Fed. 443; Rankin v. Cent. R. Co.,
77 N. J. L 175, 71 Atl. 55; Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 N. Y. 316,
9o N. F. 953. But in Bussey v. C. & V. C. R. Co., 73 S. C. 215, 53 S. E.
165, the court said the widow should sue as administratrix as provided under
the local statute. Where the lex loci delicti gives the recovery to the personal representative, the widow cannot sue in her own right in another state.
Usher v. W. J. R. Co.. supra. note 64.
'Williams v. Camden I. R. Co., 138 Fed. 57!; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v.
Warring, 37 Colo. x22, 86 Pac. 305; Hanlon v. Frederick Leyland & Co.,
-23 Mass. 438, 111 N. E. 9o7, L R. A. 1917A 34 and note; Leonard v. Cl.
;tt., Co., 84 N. Y. 48; Nelson v. C. & 0. R. Co., 88 Va. 97i, 14 S. Z 838.
Contra, Battese v. U. P. Ry. Co., 102 Kan. 468, 170 Pac. 81I; Woodward v.
Mich., etc., R. Co.; 1o Oh. St. 121.
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the place of injury was elsewhere. The same rule has been
applied to a local administrator without regard to the decedent's
domicile where the injury was sustained in another state,"" but
denied to the domiciliary administrator suing at the locus delictiA82 The cases cannot all be reconciled9sPerhaps some assistance may be had in the following analysis of the subject, which is believed to be consistent with most
of the decisions. The existence of any claim to be enforced depends upon the lex loci delicti. A statute of that state must provide for recovery if recovery is to be had. Next there is the
question of whether the claim may be sued upon outside the
state of its creation. This question is now pretty well settled
in the affirmative. Then there is the third question, which is
often confused with the second, vho is the proper person to
enforce the claim. If it is vested by the statute creating it in
some one person for his own use and benefit, such person becomes the owner and is the proper and only proper party to enforce the claim at the locus delicti or elsewhere. But if the statute provides that the action is to be brought by the administrator
or some other representative on behalf of designated beneficiaries, there seems no reason for an inflexible rule. The defendant, if he once pays to an authorized plaintiff, is discharged from
further liability.8 4 It should be immaterial to him by whom
*' Dennick v. Cent. R. Co., supra, note 36; Teti v. Consol. Coal Co., supra,
note 79. In Stewart v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., supra, note 66, the personal representative was allowed to recover in the District of Columbia, the accident took
place in Maryland. By the Maryland statute, the claim was to be sued upon
in the name of the state for the benefit of the parties named. The case contains some inaccurate dicta and has been much commented upon. See Williams
v. Camden I. R. Co., supra, note 8o; Teti v. Consol. Coal Co., supra, note 79.
' Hall v. So. Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 345, 59 S. E. 879. But in K P. Ry. Co.
v. Cutter, i6 Kan. 568, te representative appointed in Colorado was allowed
to sue in Kansas where the injury occurred. Where the decedent was domiciled in Kansas, however, the Nebraska appointed representative was not

allowed to sue in Kansas.

Metrakos v. K. C., etc., Ry. Co., 91 Kan. 342, 137

Pac. 953.

The citations in the foregoing notes are not exhaustive though they
represent the way in which most of the problems have been treated. For
further authorities see 56 L. R. A. beginning on x97; 18 L R. A. (N. S.)
As to whether a non-resident alien may sue, see
z252; L. R. A. 19i7A 34.
57 U. oF PA. L REv. 171.
".Nelson v. C. & 0. P. Co., su, ra, note 8a.

TORT OBLIG4TIONS .AND CONFLICT OF LAWS

the suit is brought. No one is injured by allowing an action to
be brought wherever the defendant may be legally served, either
by the personal representative appointed at the locus delicti, or
where the deceased was domiciled or at the place where suit is
brought. It could be said that the question of the persons in
whose name the suit is to be brought is a remedial matter and
that the lex fori must be complied with.s But the decisions
already discussed establish that the plaintiff need not have qualified as administrator at the forum. Strict adherence to technical rules regarding the proper party plaintiff will be productive of much hardship unless the rules are well defined and generally agreed upon. The period in which action must be started
under these statutes is generally short. By the time an appellate court has ruled that the suit was initiated by the wrong
plaintiff it will be too late to begin another action.
AMOUNT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES.

A statute which creates a cause of action for death by
wrongful act may set a limit to the amount which may be recovered, or otherwise regulate the assessment of damages. This
is part of the right, and is governed by the lex loci delicti s8
The same is generally true of the time in which the action must
be commenced. 8 7 It follows logically that the lex loci delicti
Bussey v. C. & W. C. R. Co., supra, note 79. Cf. Teti v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 217 Fed. 443. 453, where the court says: "'. . . the better and more
senbible doctrine . . . [is] . . . that when under . . . the statute of another
state giving or preserving a right of action to the widow or children, or parents, or other next of kin, in case of death by wrongful act, such statute
provides that suit shall be . . . prosecuted by one of the number, or by
administrators, for the benefit of all, that in New York its statutory form of
representation shall, or at least, may be followed when the action to enforce
the statute is brought in this state."
" N. P. R. Co. v. Babcock, z54 U. S. i9o, 14 Sup. Ct. 978; Lauria v.
duPont de Nemours Co., supra, note 26a, cor.menting upon a dictumn contra
in Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., supra, note 77; Powell v. G. N. R. Co.,
supra, note 37. Mr. Justice Holmes states the theory in W. U. Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 234 U. S. 542. 547, 34 Sup. Ct. 953: "When a person recovers in

one jurisdiction for a tort committed in another he does so on the ground
of an obligation incurred at the place of the tort that accompanies the person
of the defendant elsewhere, and that is not only the ground but the measure
of the maximum recovery."
" See 48 L R. A. 639 note.
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which gives the right also determines to whom the damages re-covered shall be distributed, and such is the rule. 8 An ambiguity in construction is presented, however, when the statute provides that the damages shall be distributed to the beneficiaries in
the proportion in which they would share in the decedent's estate in case of intestacy, or similar clause. Does this refer to
the statute of distributions of the place of injury or of the
decedent's domicile? The prevailing view adopts the first construction.8 9 The situation under a survival statute where it is
provided that the damages recovered become part of the personal estate of the decedent seems clearly distinguishable. In
such a case it has been held that the usual rule for devolution of
personal property, i. e., that the law of the domicile furnishes
the rule for distribution, should control.90
HERBERT F. GOODRICH.
Unh'crsity of Michigan Law School.
Pa. R. Co. v. Levine, 263 Fed. 557; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Warring,
supra. note 8o; In re Coe's Estate, 130 Iowa 307, zo6 N. XV. 743, 4 L R. A.
(N. S.) 814 and note; Chariton v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 200 Mo. 413, 98 S.
AV. 529.
" Pa. R. Co. v. Levine. supra, note 88; McDonald v. McDonald, 96 Ky. 209,
28 S. AV. 482. In the Levine case it was thought that the local statute of distributions excluded the particular decedent's estate from its operation. See
comment. 29 YALE L JoUR. 798.

"Hartley v. Hartley, 71 Kan. 691, 8I Pac. SoS.

